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Spatialities of the Secular
Geographies of the Veil in France and
Turkey
Claire Hancock
UNIVERSITÉ PARIS-XII-VAL-DE-MARNE 
ABSTRACT This article analyses the debate about the Islamic headscarf in France
and Turkey, with particular reference to the law passed in France in 2004. It aims
to bring out the spatial dimension of the secular: first, by underlining how the
issue of the veil collapses spatial scales, from the individual (female) body to
global geopolitical tensions; second, by looking at the specific place granted to
schools as the primary focus of the political rows; and third, by teasing out some
of the implicit assumptions about the ‘location’, in both France and Turkey, of the
threat to secularism. It concludes that in France, at least, the debate had less to do
with religion as such than with the place, both physical and metaphorical, granted
to the Other in French society.
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In October 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan gave an interview to the
French television channel LCI. The most widely reported item of this
interview was Erdogan’s comments on the fact that his daughters were
attending university in the US, because there, unlike in their own country,
they could go to classes wearing their headscarf (Turkey Post, 21 October
2004). While these comments may have been intended partly as a rebuke
to the French law banning headscarves (and all ostentatiously religious
forms of dress) from French public schools, and were indeed interpreted
in that way, they also served to underline the common line on secularism
of the Turkish and French states.
France and Turkey have their specific brands of secularism, known as
laïcité in the former and laiklik in the latter. Both countries also experienced
ahead of other European countries debates about where and in which con-
texts women of Muslim faith could or could not wear the Islamic veil. They
also offer two of the most striking instances in Europe of ‘men in power
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using women’s bodies as battlefields’ (Human Rights Watch, 2004b: 3), to
borrow the phrase from Turkish feminist Pinar Ilkkaracan.
In the light of discussions of the Islamic headscarf in English-language
literature, which tend to treat veiling as a personal choice, an expression of
faith or cultural belonging to be dealt with respectfully, Turkish and French
legislation banning headscarves from public schools looks like an incur-
sion of the state into a private sphere regarding the individual, family or
‘community’ only, or indeed a breach of ‘human rights’ (see Human Rights
Watch, 2004a, 2004b). The European Commission on Human Rights, how-
ever, upheld the French law, much in the way it has consistently rejected
appeals against the Turkish ban on headscarves in universities (ruling of
June 2004).1 The European legal framework therefore upholds what can be
called a ‘geography of the secular’, by mapping out spaces and places
where the practice of wearing the veil is prohibited.
In this article, I would like to look at the spatial dimension of the debates
about the veil, and the ways in which they revolve around a geography of the
secular, but also of the challenges to secularism. My general point is that spa-
tially confining the veil issue, in discourse, to certain specific scales, places
and spaces tends to overdetermine the debate, and conflate veiling with other
political issues. I attempt to show how, by challenging these implicit spatial
assignations, one can contribute to opening up the debate. By setting the
French and Turkish cases side by side, I also aim to displace assumptions
about the centrality of postcolonial tensions in France. I discuss primarily the
debate that took place in France around the time the contentious law was
passed, and use the situation in Turkey as a parallel to shed some light on it.
One aim is to rethink the classical division of space between public and
private, the centrality of which many feminist geographers have ques-
tioned (McEwan, 2003),2 and which proves overly simplistic to account for
the spatialities of the secular. Beyond this questioning of the private/pub-
lic divide, I propose to scrutinize the implicit spatial assumptions present in
debates about the veil in three ways: first, by underlining how the issue of
the veil collapses spatial scales, and how the political discourse it generates
seems to move effortlessly from the individual (female) body to global
geopolitical tensions, though it pauses at length on the intermediate scale of
the national; second, by looking at the specific place granted to schools as
the primary focus of the political rows in France, and to universities in
Turkey; and third, by teasing out some of the implicit assumptions about
the ‘location’, in both countries, of the threat to secularism.
THE SECULAR STATE AND ITS RELIGIOUS OTHER
The key word for French and Turkish attitudes to the veil is laïcité or laik-
lik respectively, the Turkish term deriving from the French: the principle
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whereby institutions should not in any way be influenced by any church
or religion. Established in France by the law separating church and state
in 1905, it was emulated by the Kemalist reformation of Turkey in the
1920s and 1930s because laiklik was seen to be a leading principle of
modernity. Turkish secularism is different from the French brand (see
Burdy and Marcou’s introduction to CEMOTI, 1995): rather than an actual
separation of church and state, it implies the subordination of the reli-
gious to the state, with imams becoming civil servants (Roy, 2005: 30, 95).
I do not attempt here to give an account of the historical context in which
these different forms of secularism evolved (for a discussion of this, see
Çinar, 2005; Göle, 2003; Hommes et Migrations, 2005), but merely outline
what seem to me to be the major points concerning the place given to
women in these evolutions, and discuss what seems to form the basis of
some misapprehensions, in Anglophone countries, about laïcité or laiklik
and their spatial implications.
As part of the Kemalist modernization process initiated by Mustafa
Kemal in Turkey in the 1920s, the adoption of western attire was strongly
encouraged and the wearing of headscarves by women discouraged, and
indeed banned in certain spaces; in parallel, the visibility of women in
public was seen as the hallmark of the new, modern Turkey (Göle, 1997).
As a result, a new dress code was established, beginning with a 1923
decree on dress; further laws in 1925 and 1934, updated in the early 1980s,
stipulated that religious clothing should not be worn outside times of wor-
ship and established guidelines regarding the dress of students and state
employees. The law has been enforced strictly since 1997 and wearing the
headscarf in Turkey is therefore prohibited not only in public schools, but
also in universities, courts of justice and official buildings generally.
In Turkey, the ‘Islamization’ of political life implies an active and sym-
bolic part played by women, which both continues and subverts the tra-
ditional visibility of women in the public sphere in Turkey. Nilüfer Göle
has shown that it is both the process of democratization of the regime and
increased access to education for women that have rekindled the debate,
since among those clamouring for the right to wear headscarves univer-
sity students are foremost (Göle, 1997). In this specific context, head-
scarves signify both a challenge to the legitimacy of the traditional,
westernized elites, and a critique of the state’s secularist universalism. As
Alev Çinar aptly summarizes: ‘The reveiling of the female body was pro-
moted by the Islamists as a sign of liberation of women and of the nation
from the oppression of the secular Westernizing state that denied the
Turkish nation its own true culture and identity’ (Çinar, 2005: 74).
In France, a deeply entrenched secularism pervades large sections of
society: for instance, a survey (conducted by opinion poll company Pew,
quoted in The Economist, 28 October 2004) indicated that only 11 percent of
French people considered religion ‘very important’, while the equivalent
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figure in Germany was 21 percent, in Italy 27 percent – and as many as 
59 percent in the US. The whole notion of laïcité revolves around the idea
that religious beliefs, which anyone is free to hold privately, are not a legit-
imate part of public life: the division between private and public is there-
fore a central tenet of French laïcité, and the legitimacy of expressions of
faith is not assessed per se but according to the type of space, or place in
which they occur.
Olivier Roy, among others, has contrasted laïcité and secularization:
while according to the latter, more common in Protestant countries, a soci-
ety gradually frees itself from the sacred without formally forgoing it, the
former results from the active eviction of the sacred, confined behind a
legally defined boundary, mostly in Catholic countries (Roy, 2005: 30).
This divergence within the West as to the importance of religion, as to its
legitimacy as a reference in politics and as to the degree of ‘sacralization’
of the state itself (Roy, 2005: 123) probably accounts for some of the mis-
understandings, or differences in assessment, between the French and
Anglo-American intellectual universes. Thus, some of the arguments for
‘toleration’ put forth in Anglo-American journals patronize French intel-
lectuals or politicians operating ‘within their own cultural limits’
(Galeotti, 1994: 676), as if Anglo-American views on these issues were not,
themselves, constrained by any ‘cultural limits’. Several scholars have
more recently discussed the specific meanings of laïcité in French political
thought and attempted to ‘translate’ French debates in order to make
them understandable, or at least less easy to caricature and dismiss, from
Anglophone points of view (see Kros, 2005; Laborde, 2002).
The Anglo-American view may be that French analysts tend to portray
young Muslim women as ‘passive victims of oppressive cultures’ (Dwyer,
1999: 8) or ‘under total control of their male relatives’ or ‘so immobilised
by the significations of their clothing that the only statement they could
possibly be making is a kind of inchoate plea for rescue’ (Moruzzi, 1994:
662). Admittedly, colonizers focused on the veil as a symbol of Islamic
backwardness and primitivism (Dwyer, 1999: 9), which made it ‘an
intense focus of symbolic struggle during the Algerian Revolution’
(Moruzzi, 1994: 663; see also Shepard, 2004). There are, therefore, distinct
postcolonial overtones in the French debate. However, as I try to show, it
may be more relevant to think of it more generally in terms of the diffi-
culty of accepting, in national political cultures strongly influenced by
universalism and dominated by centralizing states, the presence of the
Other – be it the figure of women as Others in male-dominated societies,
of people of rural origin as Others in urban societies, or the figure of the
religious believer as Other to the rational, modern citizen of secular states.
This is not to suggest, in any way, that the political contexts in France and
Turkey are identical; however, from an Anglo-American perspective, con-
ceptions of the state and its relation to citizens in both countries have many
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similarities, not least when it comes to the acceptance of difference, and in
particular of the veil, which functions in both countries as what Claire
Dwyer calls ‘an overdetermined signifier of difference’ (Dwyer, 1999).
AN ISSUE OF SCALE?
In Turkey, the türban3 is said by Islamists to constitute a protection against
the ‘cultural aggression of the West’ (CEMOTI, 1995: 23). In much the
same way, a woman wearing a headscarf in France can be seen as express-
ing the resistance of a cultural and religious specificity in the context of a
dominant, or hegemonic, culture. However, these interpretations take into
account power relations on the global and national scales, but overlook
the equally important power relations within the Muslim communities,
and the fact that it is women, and practically exclusively women,4 who are
made to stand up to oppressive state measures or cultural oppression. In
fact, what may have one meaning on one scale (i.e. veil as resistance to the
state, or as identity-assertion against the West) works very differently
indeed on other scales; and the closer one gets to the everyday lives and
to the actual bodies of the young women wearing the veil, the less distinct
such meanings become.
As Nilüfer Göle wrote, referring to Arlene MacLeod’s idea of ‘accom-
modating protest’ in Egypt, ‘a veiled woman may be delivering a political
message to Western modernism, but simultaneously she is accommodat-
ing male domination based on her invisibility and her confinement to the
space of mahrem’5 (Göle, 2003: 158). Alev Çinar subscribes to the same idea
when she writes that ‘the new veiling has the effect of reproducing and
naturalizing the power and authority of the male public gaze’ (Çinar, 2005:
77). This raises the issue of female agency: when so many political issues,
symbols and interpretations are projected onto a single item of feminine
clothing, it seems impossible to ensure that it is indeed the intention of the
wearer that is made manifest.
It is useful here to consider the body as a scale, following Linda
McDowell, who defines scale as a ‘boundary between different kinds of
spaces’ (McDowell, 1999: 40). The relevance of such a reading is demon-
strated by Alev Çinar, who shows that in the Turkish context ‘the body is
metaphorically employed not only as a symbol of the nation and its
boundaries, but also as a material space where the boundaries of the pub-
lic and the private are drawn toward the construction of the national pub-
lic subject’ (Çinar, 2005: 53): the body of individual women is therefore
obscured by the host of national symbols it is loaded with.
Bearing in mind this importance of scale, let us take a closer look at
some spatial features of the French law, passed on 25 March 2004. Unlike
the earlier ruling by the Conseil d’Etat, in 1989, that left decisions to
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exclude pupils from schools to the local level of each school, and the 
similar ruling in Britain, in 2007,6 about the right for pupils or instructors
to wear a full veil at school, this law was to apply at the national level,
across all French territory (including overseas territories such as La
Réunion, which have large Muslim minorities).
It has been argued that this law was out of scale with the actual prob-
lems, which arose in a very small number of schools, mostly located on
the outskirts of Paris. Jean Baubérot, who was a member of the commis-
sion established to study the issue and make proposals to the French pres-
ident (known as the Stasi Commission, after the name of its president7),
was the only member who refused to endorse the final report, for reasons
he has repeatedly made clear (Baubérot, 2004a, 2004b). He has argued that
passing a law seemed out of proportion with the actual extent of the prob-
lem, and has also suggested that the origin of the members of the com-
mission, reflecting French centralism (19 out of 20 were Parisian, and only
one from the provinces), may have influenced the outcome.
Furthermore, he has argued that the hypothetical need to uphold secu-
larism throughout French territory was in fact used as an excuse, since a
significant part of France, the Alsace-Moselle (the eastern area that was
annexed by Germany between 1870 and 1919) retained a specific status,
the Concordat, meaning the separation of church and state does not apply
there.8 Baubérot (2004b) has made the case that a laïcité that tolerates such
a significant territorial exception isn’t justified in disallowing the wearing
of veils by a small number of public school pupils.
Baubérot was therefore the isolated dissenter in the Stasi Commission.
Another member, Patrick Weil, an academic and specialist on immigra-
tion, has also written about his experience in the commission: 
. . . our near-unanimous sentiment (there was one dissident among our
group of 19) was that we had to understand and then address the issue at a
national level rather than merely a local one.
The reason was plain: the wearing of a headscarf or the imposition of it on
others is much more than an issue of individual freedom: it has become a
France-wide strategy pursued by fundamentalist groups who use public
schools as their battleground. (Weil, 2005: 47; emphasis in the original)
While making the point that a national scale was felt to be appropriate
in response to a perceived ‘France-wide strategy’ on the part of funda-
mentalists, Weil also implies that public schools were chosen as the ‘bat-
tleground’ by these very enemies, a claim that deserves further scrutiny.
Tellingly, among other vociferous and influential voices heard both by
the Stasi Commission and on French television, Weil mentions ‘Iranian
refugees’ (Weil, 2005), among whom the most popular was Chahdortt
Djavann, who had published a best-selling essay against the veil (Djavann,
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2003). This is symptomatic of the way in which the French debate, while
intensely national in the way it was framed or engineered, picked some
international points of reference and could at times claim to resonate with
worldwide geopolitical confrontations.
It appears therefore that the scale of the individual (female) bodies was
completely bypassed in the debate, by the prompt shift to the local scale
(discussed in more depth in the following sections), and the even swifter
shift to the national and international scales. Arguably, this obscured cru-
cial aspects of the debate, as much as it disregarded the effects on indi-
vidual young women, who ended up being denied a public education for
reasons unrelated to themselves and their choice of dress.
THE SPACES OF THE SCHOOL AND THE UNIVERSITY
Weil explains why schools were singled out, among many other possible
sites to combat fundamentalism:
. . . if the headscarf had been banned (for example) on the basis of discrimi-
nation against women, it would have been necessary to do so not only in
schools, but across the whole of society.
The ban concerns only public schools because there, those concerned are
minors. There is no question of forbidding religious display in universities
or elsewhere in the adult world. Adults have means of defence that children
do not. (Weil, 2005: 48)
Is it simply, then, because children are concerned that schools were so cen-
tral to the French debate, and can that be the basis of the distinction between
some public spaces that are key to the national identity, and others that are less
so? Other aspects have to be taken into account, which tend to demonstrate
that contrary to Weil’s claim, it was not a choice of the ‘fundamentalists’ to sin-
gle out the schools, but rather a result of some French cultural specificities.
The professional group most directly confronted with headscarf-wear-
ing pupils, teachers in secondary schools, are intellectual heir to the tra-
dition of hussards noirs de la République, the school masters sent out by the
Republic to defend republican values against the encroachments of the
clergy in the remotest areas of France in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies.9 There is therefore much to suggest that it was the religious step-
ping back into the classroom (and the potential subjection of the female in
such a religious culture) and not the fact that the religion in question was
Islam rather than Christianity that triggered reactions among teachers.
Beyond this, it is necessary to give some thought to the significance of
the school (and the university, in Turkey) as spaces. In the context of the
debate around the 2004 law, philosopher Etienne Balibar, who opposed it,
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has offered very perceptive elements to analyse the specificity of the space
of the school, in the French republican context. He describes it as a ‘place
of transition between the space of “private” existence and “public” exis-
tence in “public” space, but situated in the public space itself’ (Balibar, 2004:
20; emphasis in the original). School is a place which operates
. . . a relativization of social belonging, of beliefs, of ideologies, in order to facil-
itate the entry of individuals into the sphere of ‘politics’, of citizenship, there-
fore it has to virtually detach individuals from their primary identities. . . . What
is asked of the school is not that it be ‘neutral’, like the state, but that it operate
a neutralization, that it constitute a surplus of neutrality between two ‘spaces’ that
are not neutral, the so-called ‘private’, and the so-called ‘public’. (Balibar, 2004:
20; emphasis in the original)
Therefore, if we follow Balibar, the space of the school is a form of ‘third
space’, neither private nor public, and on which higher demands can be
placed than on private space, obviously, but also than on public space in
general. Hence, its crucial place in the French debate.
In Turkey, the focal point of debates has tended to be women wearing
headscarves to university or claiming the right to do so, who are per-
ceived as making a political statement, and not just as conforming to pri-
vate beliefs. One of the reasons for this is that there too it is a very specific
sort of space that is concerned: access to higher education for women was
one of the tenets of Kemalism. That the young women’s claim has a spa-
tial component is made clear by Nilüfer Göle’s enlightening analysis: she
notes that these young women are using the ‘space of opportunities’
opened to the female part of the population by Kemalism (Göle, 2003:
164); and she goes on to add that these ‘young women cause unease and
confusion, because they appropriate the religious signs of female confine-
ment, whilst gaining public visibility. What creates the problem is the
intrusion of Islamic references in spaces created and ruled by the liberal
and secular values of modernity’ (Göle, 2003: 170; emphasis added).
Therefore, it seems that in Turkey too, it is the construction of certain
spaces as ‘special’, as playing an essential part with respect to values per-
ceived as essential to the constitution of the national, that explains the focus
of debates on institutions of higher education: here again the sense of ‘spa-
tial transgression’ or intrusion of one sphere into another appears crucial.
We return here to the central question of the relation that citizens have
with the state: Jean Baubérot contrasts the US view of the state with the
French, as follows
In the USA, the emphasis is on the freedom of the individual vis-a-vis the
state; in France, some tend to think that freedom – in the sense of liberation
from prejudice and dogmatism – is obtained thanks to the state, the
‘Republican state’, and its leading institution, ‘the Republican school’.
(Baubérot, 2004a: 136)
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This is how a tension described as of worldwide geopolitical importance,
as essential to France’s political identity, seems to narrow down to and focus
on the very local space of public schools; more specifically, it appeared from
the coverage in the media that only a small number of schools were in fact
concerned by the issue, and that most of these were located in the banlieues.
THE LOCATION OF THE ISSUE
The evidence from French banlieues tends to demonstrate that it is not the
French state’s encroachment on their freedom that young women find
threatening, but the masculine control of their everyday behaviour
(Coutras, 2003). As has been pointed out by Tévanian (2005), this evidence
was given prominence in media coverage in the run-up to the discussion
and the vote on the law. Young Muslim women’s testimonies published in
newspapers such as Libération at the time of the debate around the law often
depict the wearing of the headscarf not as a free, personal choice, but as giv-
ing in to strong pressure, which may not originate within the family, but
from an environment of misogynist, intolerant men, who will harass
women not wearing the veil or behaving in other ways they disapprove of
(going to cafes, smoking, befriending or going out with people from outside
the community, etc.).
A political movement called ‘Ni Putes Ni Soumises’ (‘Neither Whores
nor Submissive’) drew public attention to the difficult situation of
women in the quartiers, the poor neighbourhoods of social housing with
high proportions of people of foreign origin (for a discussion in English
of the characteristics of French banlieues, see Dikeç, 2006). This move-
ment, which began in 2001, is explicitly secular, republican and claims a
mixité (a term used both to designate the coexistence of both sexes, and
that of people of different cultural backgrounds) ‘based on respect’; the
statement of intent posted on its website depicts women in the quartiers
as ‘stifled by the machismo of the men of our neighbourhoods, who use
a so-called “tradition” to deny us our most elementary rights’ (for an in-
depth discussion of the movement, see Guénif-Souilamas, 2004).
The leader of the movement, Fadela Amara,10 was among the ‘wit-
nesses’ heard by the Stasi Commission and was among the most vocal
exponents of the idea that the issue of the veil, and of female oppression,
is deeply embedded in specific parts of French cities, the banlieues (known
also as the cités or quartiers):
I think that in order to win this battle in the cités – because this is happen-
ing in the cités – I sincerely believe that we cannot consider the issue of the
veil or the debate about laïcité without taking into account the decline of the
ghettos, not to mention all the parameters of the situation in the quartiers.
(Amara, 2003) 
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In this account, which became hugely influential in 2003–4, the 
banlieues, where many people of foreign origin have become entrapped by
economic difficulties over the years, are pointed to as the location of the prob-
lem, the site from which the threat to laïcité emerges. This was, however, a
recent dimension to the debate, since, as shown by Deltombe, during the first
‘headscarf affair’, in Creil in 1989, there had been no reference to the banlieue
whatsoever (Deltombe, 2005: 151).11
The banlieues have become, in French political discourse, shorthand for
the presence of a stigmatized Other in the national body, or of ‘barbarians
at our doorstep’. In much the same way, there is in Turkey an implicit asso-
ciation between the wearing of the headscarf, the inroads of Islamist par-
ties into municipal and national politics and the massive rural immigration
that has settled in the gecekondu (informal settlements) on the outskirts of
large Turkish cities. These settlements are often described as hotbeds of
Islamist movements and the location of the threat to secularism (see, for
instance, the interview with R. Çakir, ‘La Ville, piège ou tremplin pour les
Islamistes turcs’, in CEMOTI, 1995). This resonates with the remarks of
Nilüfer Göle, who analyses the tension as ‘geographical’: ‘The türban
transfers the Islamic fact from “periphery” to “centre”. Geographically, it
moves to the cities, becomes an urban phenomenon, and culturally, it
enters the field where the central values and symbols of society are elabo-
rated’ (Göle, 2003: 100). She further expands on this common notion that
with the reveiling of women, ‘popular culture has started to infiltrate elite
tradition. And indeed this is the reality underlying common complaints in
Turkey, such as “cities have become villages” ’ (Göle, 2003: 155).
Studies have brought evidence of the ambiguous effect of headscarf
wearing in Turkish cities: on the one hand, it facilitates women’s mobility
in urban space, enables them to enter the public sphere while conforming
to their personal beliefs (Ilyasoglu, 1998). On the other hand, however, it
may cause women to be treated condescendingly, because headscarf
wearing is also associated with poor education and rural origin (Secor,
2002). Therefore, there are also ways in which wearing a headscarf in
Turkish cities can function as a sign of Otherness, underlining not just a
gender divide, but a social one, and maybe a generational one, too.12
The issue is no less complex than in France, since many Islamist party
activists in large Turkish cities are women, for whom this political activism
becomes a form of entry into public life (Secor, 2001). This resonates with
Sarah Bracke’s plea for a wider recognition of feminine forms of agency in
fundamentalist religious movements (Bracke, 2003). However, Alev Çinar,
writing about the specific Turkish context, argues that
Just as the public visibility of ‘modern women’ in the early years of the
republic had served to vest the state with political agency and to deny
agency to women themselves, the headscarf had the exact same effect for
European Journal of Women’s Studies 15(3)174
the women wearing it. It served to vest the Islamist leadership with
political agency at the cost of agency for the wearers of the headscarf.
(Çinar, 2005: 87)
It seems that the very intensity of debates in France and Turkey about
the wearing of the veil may have deprived women of what Claire Dwyer
analysed in Britain as the possibility of manipulating and challenging the
meaning of dress, and left them mostly with the ‘difficulties involved in
subverting dominant discourses’ (Dwyer, 1999: 21).
CONCLUSION
I would like to suggest that a key to understanding French attitudes
around this debate is universalism: there is a strong resistance to the idea
that differences in the national body deserve recognition,13 and a sense
that entrenching these differences in political life, in any way, is a form of
‘differentialist racism’. One young woman, Nadia, interviewed by
Libération in January 2004, as she watched the demonstrations against the
law banning headscarves in French schools, commented: ‘I came to see
how we are obliged to become a caricature of ourselves’ (Libération, 19
January 2004). Nadia opposed both the law and the wearing of head-
scarves. Her remark echoes the reflection by Etienne Balibar: ‘individuals
and collectivities that are prey to racism (its “objects”) find themselves
constrained to see themselves as a community’ (Balibar and Wallerstein,
1991: 18). The French obsession with communautarisation as anathema to
French political principles (Roy, 2005: 62) is thus projected onto minority
groups.
Polls taken in 2004, however, showed Muslim French people to be
deeply divided over the law, with 53 percent of Muslim men opposed to it
(42 percent in favour), 49 percent of Muslim women in favour (43 percent
opposed in one poll, quoted in The Economist, 21 January 2004). The same
polls showed overwhelming support for the law across French society as a
whole, regardless of the political affiliation of respondents (69 percent
were overall in favour of the law, 66 percent among supporters of the left,
75 percent among supporters of the right).
Despite the many French specificities at play in framing the debate, there
is a sense in which foreign public opinion, for instance British, has edged
closer to the French position, maybe as a result of the trauma of the 7 July
2005 bombings in London. Since the uproarious indignation at the French
law that was expressed in such forums as the European Social Forum in
London in 2004, Britain has experienced its own debate about Islamic veils,
triggered by Jack Straw’s comments in October 2006 and inflamed by the
Daily Express’s strident calls to ‘ban the veil’ in the following weeks.
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In retrospect, it seems clear that the French debate was tremendously
one-sided and that French ‘public opinion’ was strongly influenced by a
campaign in the media, as has been documented by Tévanian (2005). It also
appears, in retrospect, that the hearings of the Stasi Commission, that were
supposed to represent all sides of the argument, were probably partial.
Furthermore, the case has been put convicingly that the whole ‘headscarf
affair’ was in fact little more than a diversion, staged to distract French pub-
lic opinion from two real problems in French society: a persistent misogyny,
that the rhetoric of Muslim oppression of women conveniently projected
onto a minority group, while implicitly exonerating French society at large;
and a persistent failure to integrate people of immigrant origin, which a
focus on the headscarf no less conveniently allows to be blamed on the very
victims (Terray, 2004). On the basis of this acute analysis, the question hardly
appears to concern religion or secularism, and seems to revolve more
around the domination of French political debate and media by white males.
In much the same way, the confrontation in Turkey between Islamists and
secularists seems to be steeped in questions of acceptance of ‘Anatolian
peasants’ as a legitimate part of Turkey’s political and urban elite.
A spatial reading of the French debate, and a brief overview of the
Turkish one, allows a displacement of the ‘headscarf ban’ from the frame-
work of religion to that of politics: as seen through various scales, through
a focus on the space of the school or the university and through the under-
lying assumptions about the ‘location’ of the issue, it tells us more about
the way states and societies deal with the Other, and the place they grant
the Other, than about any spiritual matter.
NOTES
The author wishes to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for their
encouragements and very helpful suggestions to improve this article. Thanks also
to Béatrice Collignon and Jean-François Staszak for their support and help with an
earlier draft, and to Mustafa, Elif and Félix for their assistance with the revisions.
1. See Editorial, this issue, for the February 2008 ruling of the Turkish parlia-
ment which lifts the ban on headscarves being worn in universities.
2. In the case of Turkey, the relevance of the private/public divide cannot be
taken for granted, since, as Nilüfer Göle has shown, the notion of ‘pri-
vate’ in its European sense has no equivalent in Turkish (Göle, 2003: 171).
The first term of the mahrem/namahrem duality, often rendered as 
private/public, refers to the sphere of intimacy, that of female sexuality,
and therefore carries connotations of the forbidden absent from ‘private’
(Göle, 2003: 103).
3. In this article, I use the terms ‘veil’ and ‘headscarf’ indiscriminately, not
only because in the French context voile and foulard are used synonymously,
but also following Alev Çinar’s authoritative discussion of veiling and
unveiling in Turkey (Çinar, 2005). See her Chapter 2 for a full discussion of
different styles of veiling, Islamic fashion and couture.
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4. In the case of Turkey, the equally symbolic wearing of beards or facial hair
by civil servants, for example, is also frowned upon. However, I subscribe
to Nilüfer Göle’s interpretation whereby women were symbolically central
both to the Kemalist revolution (Göle, 2003: 178) and to its present contesta-
tion by Islamist movements (Göle, 2003: 183).
5. See note 2.
6. I refer here to Education Secretary Alan Johnson’s decision (‘Minister Gives
Schools the Right to Ban Muslim Veil’, The Guardian, 20 March 2007).
7. For a full discussion of the context and work of the Stasi Commission in
English, see Kros (2005) and Thomas (2006).
8. Religious education exists in primary schools and collèges, and clergymen
(of the three religions recognized at the time of the Concordat, Catholicism,
Protestantism and Judaism) are paid by the French state.
9. Olivier Roy describes French laïcité as a ‘combat laïcité’, based on anti-cleri-
calism and verbal violence, and also believes that ‘most professors who
refuse veiled pupils would show just as much intransigence if confronted by
seminarists wearing religious garb’ (Roy, 2005: 56).
10. Fadela Amara became a junior minister in the 2007 Fillon government,
responsible for politique de la ville, or urban policy.
11. By 1995, the banlieue setting is completely taken for granted: see, for
instance, Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokavar’s (1995) account, the
foreword of which begins with a stereotyped and bleak depiction of the
quartiers, despite the fact that the interviewees in their book report on prac-
tices in a number of environments both urban and suburban.
12. Nilüfer Göle’s fieldwork with young university students claiming the right
to wear the veil confirms that a large majority have modest social back-
grounds and are of rural origin. However, they are representative of their
family’s social ascension, and their choice to wear the veil, frequently
regarded negatively by their own family, often has to do with their arrival
in major cities (Göle, 2003: 95).
13. There is, for instance, a strong movement against the inclusion of ‘ethnic’ or
‘racial’ data in the national census, led by a large number of academics and
intellectuals: see Libération, 23 February and 7 March 2007. The French cen-
sus only includes data about nationality.
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